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in Honor of William Klein
January 18, 2005
Preliminary Draft

I am delighted to participate in taking up Bill Klein’s suggestion that we could
learn something by attempting a functional typology of corporation law. As a starting
point, any typology must be animated by an underlying theory whose terms dictate the
lines the typology draws. I want to focus my contribution at the level of the theory that
might animate the architecture of this grid. To see what I mean by this, think of the
Sesame Street version of Edward Levi’s classic An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. The
character points at a board on which there are pictures of a number of objects and sings:
“One of these things is not like the other; One of these things just doesn't belong.”1 The
idea is to teach the children (and law students) to distinguish between categories based on

*

Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, and Marc & Eva Stern Professor
of Law and Business, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Victor Goldberg, Michael Klausner and
participants at the Mercatus Center conference on Critieria for Good Laws of Business Associations, for
comments on an earlier draft.
1
The full lyrics are:
One of these things is not like the others,
One of these things just doesn't belong,
Can you tell which thing is not like the others
By the time I finish my song?
Did you guess which thing was not like the others?
Did you guess which thing just doesn't belong?
If you guessed this one is not like the others,
Then you're absolutely...right!
www.rlyrics.com/S%5CSesameStreet/OneOfTheseThingsIsNotLikeTheOthers.asp

a principle. My concern here is on the principle that might allow us to choose among Bill
Klein’s litany of potential criteria of good corporate law.
In particular, I will focus on the separation theorem, which states the implications
of complete capital markets on shareholder preferences concerning corporate investment
policy. My proposition is that the presence of markets in the characteristics that
determine equity value makes a radical difference in the function played by corporate
law, in these circumstances essentially limiting the criteria for good corporate law to a
single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth. I will
illustrate the usefulness of a uni-critierion view of corporate law by briefly taking up two
familiar issues that span the corporate law domain: the idea of a stakeholder-oriented
board of directors in public corporations, and the role of the courts in enforcing the
reasonable expectations of private corporation shareholders.
This emphasis on the link between markets, asset pricing and legal institutions has
been a familiar theme in my work. For example, I have argued that business lawyers
function to make up for market failures in asset pricing.2 Similarly, Reinier Kraakman
and I have stressed that familiar institutions operate to alleviate failures in the
information market and thereby operate to support price efficiency.3 I am convinced that
the benefit of working out this interaction between the structure of institutions, including
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Ronald J . Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing; Ronald J. Gilson
& Robert Mnookin,
3
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Re. 549
(1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years later:
The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. Law L. 718 (2003). Robert Merton has recently generalized this focus on
the intersection of institutional structure and imperfect markets in what he styles “a synthesis of function
and structure.” Robert Merton & Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Toward a Synthesis of Function
and Structure, (Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 02-074, June 22, 2004), available on SSRN at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313651
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here the structure of corporation law4, and the efficiency and completeness of related
markets, results in a good deal more than what my friend Bob Mnookin refers to as
“cute” theory – that is, theory which appears elegant at first glance, but whose simplicity
results not from deep insight but from surface facility
Of course, the account I offer for this occasion is too brief to convince anyone that
I am right. My ambition is only to persuade readers that the question is interesting and
the answer worth further consideration. So limited an objective opens the effort to a
criticism another former colleague addressed some years ago. In presenting a paper at a
Stanford Law School workshop, Bob Gordon anticipated the kind of comment that I
expect many of us have feared was in the minds of the audience even if no one actually
said it. At the outset of his presentation, Gordon said he understood that, when they
heard his talk, many people in the room would conclude that they could have come up
with the same point if they had thought about the problem for three minutes, and
acknowledged that the room was full of people who were clever enough to do just what
they claimed. He defended his effort, and so will I defend mine, with the simple point
that thinking is hard work and three minutes is a long time.
I. Separation and the Pruning of the Criteria of Good Corporation Law
Now consider the separation theorem. Separation exists when capital markets are
sufficiently complete that shareholders can fully diversify and, as a result, shareholder

4

Michael Klausner complains that the term “structure of corporate law” is frequently used but rarely
defined. I use the term to reflect the fact that the core of the corporate statute is not a set of rules, but rather
the creation of three decision making bodies – managers, directors and shareholders – and the assignment
of general spheres of authority to each. Corporate decisions then are shaped by the interaction among
those components, as influenced by the markets in which the corporation participates. Almost everything
non-trivial about corporate law involves the play among those decision makers. See Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L.
Rev. 819 (1981). As Melvin Eisenberg noted almost thirty years ago, in this respect corporate law is
constitutional. Melvin C. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law 1 (1976).
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wealth is therefore affected by corporate decisions only through their impact on stock
price. In that circumstance, shareholders will be unanimous about the corporation’s
objective function. Every shareholder is best served if the corporation acts to increase the
value of the corporation’s stock without regard to risk. In turn, this unanimity makes the
function of public corporation law straightforward: legal rules should function to
facilitate share value maximization.
This application of the separation theorem has a quick and rather dramatic effect
on the list of criteria that Bill Klein would have us assess as potential measures of good
corporate law: most of the list disappears. In effect, the separation theorem defines away
all of the other goals that Bill Klein treats as part of corporate law, such as fairness,
redistribution, control of political and economic power, issues of antitrust and the like.
This pruning of candidates is more than slight of hand. Rather, the narrow focus reflects
a distinction between rules that allow corporations to engage in activities that effectuate
their shareholders’ unanimity by maximizing share value, and rules that seek to regulate
those activities for other social purposes. This latter category is part of corporate law
only because of a regulator’s belief that corporate law is a useful instrument, compared to
other alternatives, to accomplish a non-corporate law regulatory objective. Thus,
arguments that a particular corporate law rule fosters greater environmental or antitrust
compliance are better situated in those domains. I am concerned here with the former
category – corporate law as a means to increase shareholder value – because I believe it
to be the only distinctive feature of corporate law.5

5

See Jesse Choper, John C. Coffee & Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations 180 (5th ed.
2000); David Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L.Rev. 1 (1979).
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This distinction between the internal function of corporate law and the use of
corporate law as a lever to accomplish an external goal parallels the more familiar debate
about the use of tax expenditures – that is, provisions of the tax law that harness the tax
structure to achieve a different social goal, like providing incentives for favored activities
through the provision of tax credits. There has been a lively tax law debate about the
circumstances when tax expenditures are appropriate compared to direct subsidies to the
activity in question, and it is well beyond the scope of my effort here to assess the
circumstances when the instrumental use of corporate law is desirable.6 My point is
merely that the measure of good corporate law when separation applies is a very focused
inquiry: how well does corporate law facilitate maximizing shareholder wealth? All
other uses of corporate law should be turfed to the policy area that motivates the
incursion.
II. Separation and the Law of Public Corporations
With the criterion for good corporate law when separation applies now in mind,
we can address the implication of separation in both of the two broad domains of
corporate law: public and private corporations. I take up the implications of the
separation theorem for public corporation law in this section and for private corporations
in the next.7
Because the markets in which the corporation participates – capital, employment,
and product -- are not perfect, they do not fully solve the corporation’s core agency
problem. Organizational structure, like capital structure, therefore affects shareholder
6

Mark Kelman provides a very helpful account of the tax debate. Mark Kelman, Strategy or Principle?
The Choice Between Regulation and Taxation (1999).
7
For present purposes, I will not try to define the two domains beyond distinguishing between
corporations with and without a liquid trading market in their common equity. In particular, I will not use
the term close corporation, which carries with it a good deal of baggage that is unnecessary to my analysis.
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value. Reflecting Harold Demsetz’s insight, corporations in different industries and with
different business strategies adopt different structures.8 Public corporation law, to
facilitate maximizing firm value, should facilitate the process by which companies adopt
the most effective organizational form for their business. This includes especially the
“market in organizational form,” by which I mean the potential for the imposition of a
new organizational form through external pressure. This potential for externally induced
change serves to ameliorate the frictions in capital, employment and product markets that
allow agency problems to persist.
So what does this get us in terms of the function of corporate law? I will sketch
here a few directions in which one might take the point. The general conclusion is that
corporation law should facilitate an external market for organizational form by adopting
default rules that keep the corporation open to the market, subject to the shareholders
making a different choice in a particular circumstance.
First, a separation-based perspective on the function of public corporation law
poses a stark challenge to the claim that a stakeholder-oriented board of directors has
anything to do with corporate law, as opposed to corporate management. Put bluntly, the
claim is either trivial or is trumped by market processes. The claim for a stakeholder
orientation is trivial in the sense that one cannot run a successful business without taking
seriously the role of non-shareholders whose contribution is important to the

8

Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Control and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J. L. & Econ.
375 (1983); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lane, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ, 1155 (1985).
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corporation’s success9 If something more is meant, the market for organizational form
provides a more focused alternative.
Because the production function differs between industries, we observe different
roles for stakeholders – providers of inputs other than equity capital – in different
industries. For example, the distribution of stock option grants among employees is
vastly different in high technology companies and traditional smoke stack companies. It
is no surprise that technology companies led the chorus of concerns about the impact of
accounting rules on the efficiency of getting equity into the hands of employees (even if
it remains hard to understand why they care). Because human capital is the dominant
input in these companies, options are used far more pervasively than in traditional
industries.10 Similarly, hostile takeovers are extremely rare in industries where
employees and know-how figure larger in the management equation and are far more
difficult to transfer to an acquirer without the cooperation of the target.11 The point is
that markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits the corporation’s
business. Corporate law has nothing to add to the process.
It then follows that default rules which isolate the corporation from the market by
creating barriers to shareholder influence – for example, impediments to shareholders
eliminating poison pills or regulation that operates on an “opt-out” rather than an “opt-in”

9

So, for example, those arguing that hostile takeovers are bad for stakeholders need to be clear about
whether the point is that doing something for stakeholders makes shareholders better off – an issue of
management – or whether the claim is that takeovers raise a distributional issue between stakeholders and
shareholders. I continue to be surprised that the debate has gone on this long with a demand for clarity on
this point.
10
Ronald J. Gilson & David Schizer Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation for
Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 H. L. Rev. 874 (2003) discuss the importance of equity incentives to
entrepreneurial activity and the intuitional structure that developed to support their provision..
11
The success of the Oracle hostile offer for PeopleSoft raises the possibility that the key is not just the
percentage of human capital in the production function that drives the outcome, but also the level of
competition in the particular employment market.
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basis – get in the way of assuring a match between a corporation’s governance and its
business. To be sure, some shareholders nonetheless may adopt restrictive governance
structures. Google and Dreamworks recent use of a Swedish style, two class common
stock structure with 10 to 1 voting difference, to go public are recent illustrations of
Daines & Klausner’s and Coate’s12 broader finding that shareholders at the IPO stage
frequently adopt mechanisms that shield the company from the market for corporate
control (and therefore from the market for organizational form). But the key is that
choice, and its reversal, remains with the shareholders who bear the cost or reap the
benefit of the particular match between the corporation’s organization and control
structure and its business. One implication, for example, is that the ambiguity in
Delaware law regarding shareholder bylaw initiatives should be resolved to allow
shareholders to eliminate a poison pill.13
The most familiar argument that corporate law provisions favoring a stakeholderoriented board are not trivial is driven by the belief that the stock market systematically
applies too high a discount rate to future earnings. The claim is that a myopic stock
market stock market leads managers to prefer short-term over higher return long-term
strategies, for example by ignoring long-term commitments to stakeholders that are
necessary to efficient production in the long run to the end of boosting short-term
earnings. Here, however, legal strategies are trumped by the potential for related markets
to respond to failures in the primary market. Merton offers a simple example that

12

Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPOs Maximize Firm Value: An Empirical Study of
Antitakeover Protections, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001); John C. Coates, Explaining Variations in
Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 Cal. L.Rev. 1301 (2001).
13
See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, 26 Del. J.Corp. L. 491 (2001).
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illustrates how markets can overcome this kind of a bias.14 Suppose individuals suffer
from a systematic cognitive bias that causes them to underestimate their life expectancies,
and therefore to pay too much for life insurance relative to an actuarially fair price.
Competition among life insurers (which assumes no significant entry barriers), who do
know the actuarial cost of the insurance, will drive the price down to the actuarial fair
level despite the systematic bias of consumers. The impact of the bias is corrected by
operation of a market that does not suffer from the bias, even though consumers do. The
solution is not without cost – transactions costs are associated with the operation of the
corrective market response – but the larger the market, the lower the unit costs.
The same type of analysis applies to the claim that investor bias leads to shortterm management in public companies. Assume that stock market investors
systematically apply too high a discount rate to expected corporate earnings, and further
assume that the optimal planning horizon differs in different industries.15 Under these
assumptions, the stock market will systematically undervalue companies with longer
planning horizons relative to companies with shorter time horizons. As with Merton’s
insurance example, however, a related market can alleviate the bias. The private equity
market operates to ameliorate the failure in the market for public corporation equity –
competition among investors who do not suffer from a short-term bias will drive stock
price toward an unbiased level. The dramatic growth of the private equity market and the
expansion in the range of industries in which private equity funds now operate are

14

Merton & Bodie, supa note 2.
The assumption of systematic bias also assumes the absence of corrective trading by arbitrageurs. See
Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later, supra note 2.
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consistent with this intuition: a corporation’s most efficient source of capital is driven by
the character of its business and competitive responses to market failures.16
Again, the lesson for public corporation law is to get out of the way of corrective
market responses. When public investors systematically get it wrong, markets will
respond. They will do so imperfectly and with significant transaction costs, but the
appropriate performance measure is not a perfect market, but the performance of the
alternative: the role of the Delaware courts in shaping organizational form in a fashion
that is difficult for shareholders to change. The same humility that animates the business
judgment rule surely teaches that courts will be no better in choosing the right
governance structure for a corporation than in evaluating a corporation’s business
strategy,. Nonetheless, judicial doctrine that blocks shareholders from making
corrections in the governance structure casts courts in precisely this role. The
combination of the separation theorem and related market responses to primary market
failures counsels in favor of public corporation law setting as the default a governance
structure that opens the corporation to the markets. Where there are claims of shorttermism, or the need for effective precommitment, markets will do a better job of
assessing their validity than will a court. And, in the end, shareholders always can
choose a more restrictive structure but without the barriers that now confront shareholder
efforts to eliminate managerially imposed restrictions.
16

The idea that public and private equity are governance alternatives is at the core of Michael Jensen’s
famous brief for the role of private equity. See Michael Jensen, The Eclipse of the Public Corporation,
Harv. Bus. Rev. 61 (Sept.-Oct. 1989). To be sure, not all governance failures are likely to evoke a
corrective response in an associated market. For example, excessive management compensation is not a
likely candidate for an easy market fix. Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the breadth of
application. For example, a controlling shareholder bears the cost of a continuing mismatch between
corporate structure and value maximization. Empirical evidence suggests that over time controlling
shareholders correct the mismatch even where it means giving up disproportionate control. See Ronald J.
Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Taxonomy (working paper,
Dec. 2004).
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III. Separation and the Law of Private Corporations
Viewing private corporations through the lens of separation yields quite different
implications. Because shareholders in private corporations typically invest their human
capital along with their financial capital and because of limited liquidity, they cannot
diversify their investment. As a result, we would not expect shareholder unanimity on
strategy because corporate decisions will affect the shareholders’ wealth other than
through the value of the stock (which is difficult to determine in any event). As a result,
shareholders will not agree that the corporation should maximize firm value without
regard to risk or to the value of the shareholders’ other assets. To use a familiar example
from the case law, a shareholder’s employment relation with the corporation may have a
greater impact on her wealth than the corporation’s strategic decisions. This opens up a
role for corporate law that is not present in public corporations. Individuals may be both
opportunistic and biased; unlike in the public corporation setting, no market operates to
correct the problem.
So what is the role for law? Part of the answer is familiar. Corporate law
imposes a default rule: what rules would parties, who in fact did not choose any to govern
the particular dispute, have selected if they made the decision rationally and with
complete knowledge?17 This default rule approach extends to a judicial role in assessing
the distributive issues, cast in terms of fiduciary duty, that are central to the private law of
corporations precisely because separation does not apply. A common formulation of this

17

This formulation is intentionally broad enough to include the concept of default rules operating to force
honest negotiating behavior. The nice thing about the conference’s requirement of brevity is that the
difficult details can be ignored.
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approach is for the court to apply a judgmental default rule: enforce the parties’
“reasonable expectations.”18
The absence of separation makes it easy to understand why we are so easily
persuaded that courts should be involved in private corporation distributional disputes.
For example, the litany of cognitive biases that have been catalogued by psychologists
provides persuasive evidence that some people may make systematically bad decisions
for a variety of different reasons, leaving the private corporation contract incomplete and
shareholders open to opportunism. I imagine that most of us have had the experience of
reading the list of entries in a survey of biases and, at least in private, acknowledging
with respect to each entry that “I do that.”19 Because in private corporation distributional
issues, unlike in Merten’s insurance example and the specter of short-termism in public
corporations, no market is available to render these mistakes benign, an institutional role
appears for courts: as mediator of distributional conflicts when the parties, whether
because of cognitive bias or other informational barriers, did not anticipate or
systematically misapprehended the problems.
But, and here is the insight that I hope warrants three minutes of thought, the
same analysis implies significant limits that typically are not acknowledged by courts that
take up the challenge of assessing with hindsight the warring parties’ previously unstated
reasonable expectations. I will discuss two briefly here, but readers surely will have their

18

For present purposes I will not take up the interesting doctrinal issues that arise when the reasonable
expectations standard must be operationalized. For example, are the parties’ reasonable expectations fixed
at the time of incorporation, or is the court’s role akin to a labor arbitrator whose job is to adjust the terms
of the arrangement in light of history and current conditions?
19
For a recent survey of the biases and the empirical evidence of biases in the context of the capital market,
see Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in Handbook of the Economics
of Finance (George Constantinides, Milt Harris & Rene Stolz eds., 2003).
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own additions to the list. One goes to the imperfect ability of the bias literature to dictate
a determinative outcome; the second goes to the real risk of judicial hubris.
The first limit simply reflects the indeterminacy resulting from the sheer range of
biases for whose existence the empirical literature provides support. The number of
biases, taken together with the general absence of precision about which bias, or
combination of biases, are operative in particular circumstances, leaves a decision maker
too much freedom in applying the concept to explain the behavior in a particular case.20
Moreover, with respect to any particular bias, the experimental literature does not
demonstrate that everyone suffers from it; in all studies, a significant portion of the
sample appears to be immune. Thus, in a specific case, it may be difficult for a court
actually to observe whether a particular bias was operative, with the result that the
parties’ reasonable expectations remain opaque.
Sam Issacheroff and his colleagues have usefully considered the implications of
the indeterminacy of the bias literature for its legal application,21 for present purposes the
application of this body of social science by courts. They urge its application only in
accord with the principle of “asymmetric paternalism.” The idea is to rely on the
potential for bias only in framing default rules that can be contracted out of by more
sophisticated parties. Where the parties do contract out of a default rule, the choice
would be respected despite claims that the decision to contract out was itself the product
of a bias. In this setting, the court’s intervention affects sophisticated and unsophisticated

20

“Start with the familiar complaint that the sheer number of biases that have been identified, together with
the absence of precision about which bias, or combination of biases, are operative in particular
circumstances, leaves too many degrees of freedom in assigning causation.” Gilson & Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty years Later, supra note 3.
21
Colin Camerer, et. al., Regulation for Conservative: Behavioral Economics and the Case of Asymmetric
Paternalism, 151 U.Pa. L.Rev. 1211 (2003).
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parties differently: the decisions of parties who make an explicit choice are respected,
while courts would review the reasonable expectations of those who do not make such a
choice.
The second limit generalizes the first: courts should be hesitant in imposing an
after the fact construction of what the parties really had in mind, even when engaged in
the generally useful task of interpreting an incomplete contract or in the context of
selecting a default rule. In assessing a court’s role in interpreting contracts entered into
between firms, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently argued that courts should both
limit themselves to strictly textualist interpretation and be parsimonious in their
assignment of default rules, in both cases because default rules in the form of standards
like reasonable expectations too often lead to bad results.22 Private corporate law is
contract law in positive terms – identifiable individuals elect to go into business with
each other on terms more or less ambiguously specified by agreement or statutory
default.23 Schwartz and Scott assume away most of the power of the cognitive bias
evidence by limiting their normative claim to a category of large, sophisticated firms
where biases are least likely to influence behavior. However, their concerns about the
limited capacity of courts to improve outcomes survive even in the face of a more robust
role for individual biases. One powerful implication concerns whether courts should
inquire into the reasonable expectations of sophisticated shareholders in large private
corporations. In this setting, the Schwartz and Scott position seems as powerful when

22

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541
(2003).
23
This point raises an interesting issue with respect to the breadth of Bill Klein’s ambition for a taxonomy
of the functions of corporate law. For this purpose, private corporate law simply may be a subset of
contract law rather than a subset of the body of law that also covers public corporations. Framed this way,
separation then serves to distinguish between the conceptual domains of corporate and contract law.
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applied to judicial efforts to fill in the claimed incompleteness of private corporate law as
it does in the case of commercial contracts between sophisticated firms.24
We are thus left with a tension between the potential for courts to alleviate the
distributional inequities that result from individuals contracting incompletely under the
burden of cognitive bias or ignorance, and the reality that courts are unlikely to be very
good at realizing that potential. Reading the cases with this tension in mind might
provide some guidance about where the balance actually comes out.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that viewing corporate law through the prism of the separation
theorem advances Bill Klein’s project of a functional typology of corporate law, and set
out two implications that derive from this view. First, I suggested that, given unanimity
concerning the firm’s investment policy, the only distinctive part of public corporation
law concerns shareholder value maximization; everything else is either management or
an extension of a different regulatory regime. Bill’s litany of criteria, at least for public
corporations, is reduced to one. Second, I suggested that private corporation law leaves
room for more specific application of general contract principles, and I left open the
possibility that private corporation law is not corporate law at all, but more appropriately
considered a particular application of contract law. The effort to work through this
analysis convinces me that Klein’s project has value by providing a discipline that forces
scholars to be explicit about premises that are too often hidden. Knowing Bill, that is an
outcome that would please him.

24

See Choper, Coffee, & Gilson, supra note 7, at 816-18.
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